rbac-audit v1.0.0
rbac-audit
rbac-audit reads the JSON that kubectl get roles,rolebindings,clusterroles,clusterrolebindings -A -o json prints and works out who can do what: which subjects hold cluster-admin, which roles use wildcards, which can read every secret, open a shell in pods or change RBAC itself, and which bindings hand rights to anonymous users, every authenticated user or the default service account. Findings point at the role or binding by kind and name.
Live demo: https://jvch0512.github.io/rbac-audit/ (Synthetic cluster exports.)
Crystal 1.x, standard library only. The demo page is rendered from the tool's --tsv output by scripts/site.py (Python 3, only needed to regenerate the page).
Use
make build
build/rbac-audit examples
build/rbac-audit cluster-rbac.json --tsv
build/rbac-audit ./exports --fail-on high # exit 1 on any high finding
Export with kubectl get roles,rolebindings,clusterroles,clusterrolebindings -A -o json > rbac.json. Pass a file or a directory (all *.json files, searched recursively).
| Rule | Severity | What it catches |
|---|---|---|
| RBAC001 | critical, high or medium | a binding to cluster-admin: critical for anonymous or all authenticated users or all service accounts, high for a service account, medium for other users and groups |
| RBAC002 | high | a role with * verbs on * resources |
| RBAC003 | high or medium | a role that can read secrets (get, list, watch or *): high in a ClusterRole, medium in a Role |
| RBAC004 | high | a role that can create on pods/exec, pods/attach or nodes/proxy, or create pods with * |
| RBAC005 | high | the verbs escalate, bind or impersonate |
| RBAC006 | medium | a role that can create or change roles and bindings |
| RBAC007 | medium | a binding that gives rights to a default service account |
| RBAC008 | critical | any binding to system:anonymous or system:unauthenticated other than the built-in discovery roles |
| RBAC000 | info | the file is not a Kubernetes list, or is not valid JSON |
See examples and docs/sample-output.txt.
Limits
- It looks at roles and bindings. Admission policies,
NetworkPolicy, pod security settings and cloud IAM mappings (EKS, GKE, AKS) are outside scope. - Aggregated cluster roles are read as stored: rules added through
aggregationRulelabels appear only if the export includes the final rules. - Objects whose name starts with
system:and the built-incluster-admin,admin,editandviewroles are not flagged as roles. Bindings to them are. resourceNamesrestrictions are ignored, so a rule limited to one secret is still reported as a secret reader.
Where it fits
Kubernetes security reviews, CIS benchmark work and pre-audit evidence gathering: a fast first pass over who holds power in a cluster.
Tests
make test # Crystal specs: role and binding rules on good and bad input, JSON shapes, hostile input, 3000-case fuzzing and CLI exit codes
MIT.
rbac-audit
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- about 3 hours ago
- November 16, 2026
MIT License
Mon, 16 Nov 2026 12:12:43 GMT